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CURRENT DECISIONS
ALIENS-NATRALIZATION-LimiTATION OF TImE FOR FILING PETITiN.-In 1905
Morena declared his intention under the law then in force to become a citizen
of the United States and in 1914 he filed in court his petition for citizenship.
The Act of June 29, 19o6, c. 3592, 34 St. 596 (Comp. St. 1916, sec. 4362) pro-
vides (sec. 4) that "not less than two years nor more than seven years after
he has made such declaration of intention he shall make and file in duplicate a
petition" for citizenship. The old law contained no limitation as to the
maximum interval ,which might elapse between the declaration and the final
petition. Held, that an alien who made his declaration before the act of 19o6
was required to file his petition not more than seven years after the date of the
act. United States v. Morena (1918) 38 Sup. Ct. 151.
This decision sets at rest a point upon Which the decisions of the lower federal
courts were in conflict.
ALIEN ENEmIES-RIGHT TO SUE-SusPENSION OF SUIT BY PARTNERSHIP HAV-
ING ALIEN ENEMY MEmBER.-Action was brought by the plaintiffs, a partner-
ship, to recover money due from the defendant. The plaintiffs' firm consisted
of six members, of whom one was an alien enemy, but it appeared in the
liquidation of the firm as constituted at the outbreak of the war that he was
indebted to the partnership in a larger amount than his share of the sum
involved in the suit. A motion to stay prosecution of the suit was granted
and the plaintiffs appealed. Held, that no stay should have been granted.
Speyer Bros. v. Rodriguez (1917, C. A.), noted in LAW JOURNAL (English) Dec.
I, 1917, p. 430.
The opinion states that the defendant's contention would in effect condemn
all British subjects who had the misfortune at the outbreak of war to have
an alien enemy partner to stand out of all moneys due to the firm at that date
for an indefinite time, even though the alien enemy's share of those debts was
small and there was no fear that he would during the war be able t6 handle it
or derive any immediate benefit from it. See (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 420.
CONFLICT OF LAws-EFFECT IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES OF WAR EMERGENCY
LEGISLATION OF BELLIGERENT CouNTRIE.-A German subject resident in Switzer-
land entered in 19oo into a contract of insurance with a French insurance com-
pany. In 1915 he removed to- Germany, offering to pay in Switzerland the
premium due. The French company refused to accept it on the ground that
the French legislative decree of September 27, 1914, prohibited and declared
void the performance of obligations contracted with and owing to or by subjects
of Germany. The insured then brought an action in Switzerland to compel
the French company to accept the premium. Held, that the action could be
maintained, since the contract, having been concluded in Switzerland, was
subject to Swiss la~w and the Swiss courts would not enforce in Switzerland
war legislation of France, this being a matter of public and not of private law.
In re Cie. Nationale (French) v. Biermann (German) (Supreme Court of
Switzerland, Apr. 17, 1916) reported in (1917) 44 CLuNET 3o6.
This is in accordance with general principles of continental law by which a
state will not enforce provisions of the public law of foreign countries not
made a part of the original contract. A fortiori, it would seem that the courts
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of a state should not enforce special legislation of a belligerent country in a
struggle in which their country is neutral.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CNSTITUTIONALITY OF SELECTIVE DRArT ACT.-The
plaintiff in error, convicted of failing to present himself for registration in
violation of the "selective draft act" of May 18, 1917, challenged the validity of
the act. Held, that the act was constitutional. Arver v. United States (1918) 38
Sup. Ct 159.
For a brief discussion of previous decisions by less authoritative courts to
the same effect, see (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 133. The opinion of the
Supreme Court is chiefly devoted to the general question of the power of
Congress to provide for compulsory military service, which is upheld in the
most positive terms as within the power expressly given by Art I, sec. 8, of
the Constitution "to raise and support armies." The court also disposes sum-
marily of various minor objections to special features of the act, most of
which were also raised in the previous cases above referred to.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-PROHIBITING POSSESSION OF LIQUOR FOR
PERSONAL USE.-A state statute (Idaho, Laws 1915, ch. II) declares it unlawful
for any person "to have in his possession any intoxicating liquors except as in
this act provided." The defendant was arrested for having in his possession a
bottle of whiskey for his own use. Contending that the statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment he sought by habeas corpus proceedings to obtain his
discharge. The state court sustained the statute. The petitioner sued out a
writ of error. Held, that the statute was constitutional. Crane v. Campbell
(1917, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 98.
Mr. Justice McReynolds's opinion states "that the right to hold intoxicating
liquors for personal use is not one of those fundamental privileges of a citizen
of the United States which no state may abridge." The decision is one of first
impression before the Supreme Court There has been a conflict among state
courts. See (1917) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 286.
CONTRACTS-UNILATERAL-OFFER IRREVOCABLE AF=ER PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE.-
A landowner appointed the plaintiff as his sole agent to sell certain land, and
agreed to sell on certain terms. He gave notice of revocation to the plaintiff
while the latter was in treaty with a buyer. Later, the buyer agreed to the
owner's terms, but the owner refused to sell. Held, that the offer to the agent
was irrevocable after he had spent time, effort, and money in carrying out the
owner's desires, and that the owner must pay the specified commission. Braniff
v. Blair (1917, Kan.) 65 Pac. 816.
This is an application of the rule that an offer may become irrevocable prior
to complete acceptance, where the requested acceptance is to consist of a number
of acts requiring an appreciable length of time and effort or expense. See
Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations (1917) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 169, 191-i96, citing cases in accord
and contra.
DAMAGES-MITIGATION--EXCESSIVE FREIGHT CHARGE PAID BY SHIPPER AND
COLLECTED FROM CUSTOMERS.-The plaintiff lumber company paid excessive
freight rates to the defendant carrier for transporting lumber and now seeks
to recover the amount of such excess. The carrier contended that the
plaintiff had suffered no damage because it had collected from its customers
the amount of such excess freight rates. Held, that the defendant was liable
for the difference between the reasonable rate and the excessive rate paid by
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the plaintiff. Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Tanzer Lumber Co. (Jan. 21, Igi8)
U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct Term, No. I32.
The opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes contains the following: "The plaintiffs
suffered losses to the amount of the verdict when they paid. Their claim
accrued at once in the theory of the law and it does not inquire into later
events. . . . Probably in the end the public pays the damages in most cases
of compensated torts."
FEDERAL COURTS-URISDIcTION--FINALTY OF JUDGMENT OF C. C. A.-The
plaintiff brought suit in a state court against the carrier to recover damages for
injuries to an interstate shipment of live stock. The suit was removed to the
federal court on the sole ground of diversity of citizenship, and judgment for
the plaintiff was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. A writ of error
was taken to the Supreme Court. Held, that though the suit might have been
removed from the state court on the ground that it arose under the laws of the
United States (the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act being
involved), nevertheless the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was final,
since the sole ground for removal set forth in the petition was diversity of
citizenship; and that the writ of error must consequently be dismissed. White,
C. J., dissenting. Southern Pa. Co. v. Stewart (1917, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 130.
INSURANcE (AccmEftT)-CONsTRucTIoN OF PoLicY-AccIDENT INDUCING Tu-
nERcuiosIs.-The insured held an accident policy of insurance against bodily
injury sustained "through accidental means directly, independently and ex-
clusively of all other causes." An accidentally sprained wrist resulted in per-
manent disability because of latent tuberculosis in the insured's system. The
insurance company contended that the plaintiff's injury was not within the terms
of the policy. Held, that the insurance company was liable. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of N. Y. v. Mitchell (P. C.) [1917] A. C. 592.
The court argues that "the accident had a double effect-it sprained the
tendons and it induced the tuberculous condition. These two things acted
together . . . ; but while they are both ingredients of the disabled
condition, there has been and is, on the true construction of the policy, only one
cause, namely, the accident"
INsuRA-cE (FIRE)-AvoIDAN cE OF POLICY By FRAUDULENT PROOF OF Loss.-
In an action to recover for a total loss of insured merchandise the company's
defense was that the over-valuation in the sworn proof of loss was fraudulent
and avoided the policy under the usual provision against false swearing. The
plaintiff had access to his ledger showing the actual value of the goods, but
over-stated their value by 25% to 50o%. The trial court found the loss to be
less than one-half the amount stated in the proof of loss and rendered judg-
ment for the plaintiff. Held, that the judgment was erroneous as this evidence
conclusively established a willful and fraudulent over-valuation, which pre-
cluded any recovery. Dossett v. First Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (1917, Tenn.) I98
S. W. 889.
The cases are not in accord as to how great the disproportion must be between
the value as found by-the jury and that stated in the proof of loss to lead the
court to declare the existence of fraud established. Richards, Insurance (3d ed.)
313. In the principal case, however, the extent of the unexplained discrepancy
between the plaintiff's own ledger and the proof of loss would seem consistent
only with bad faith.
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INTERNATIONAL LAw-CEssIoN OF TE TORY-EFFEaC UPON NATIONALITY OF
INHAITATs.-The plaintiff was born in I88I in Dobritch, then in Bulgaria.
In I9O2 he removed to France permanently. In 1913 under the treaty of
Bucharest terminating the .second Balkan war, Dobritch, by a rectification of
frontiers, was ceded to Rumania. Subsequently he had received Rumanian
passports. The defendant objected to the prosecution of the suit oi the ground
that the plaintiff was of Bulgarian nationality, hence an alien enemy. Held,
that the action could not be maintained. Burgard v. Mair (Tribunal Civil de
Saint Etienne, June 7, 1916) reported in (1917) 44 CLUNET 193.
The opinion states that while birth in the territory conferred nationality,
cession of the territory, being but a rectification of frontiers, did not change
the nationality of those not actually domiciled in it, i. e., of those domiciled
abroad. It would seem that had it involved the cession of a geographical
province or of a state, instead of a small undefined portion of territory, it might
have carried with it a change of nationality of those born in it, even though
domiciled abroad. No other case presenting the same problem has been found
in the reports or literature examined.
INTERNATIONAL LA--MILITARY OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRiTORY-SuBsTITU-
TION OF AUTHORITY OF OccUPANT.-The defendant, who was arrested in a part
of Russian Poland occupied by Germany, was tried in Germany. He claimed
that he was held illegally, having been taken into Germany without extradition
proceedings and without consent of the Russian authorities. Held, that his
arrest and trial were lawful, because while occupied enemy territory remains
enemy and does not become national territory by the occupation, the occupant
exercises jurisdiction therein in matters of public law in substitution for the
replaced authority of the original sovereign and this jurisdiction warrants the
arrest of criminal offenders there and their trial in the national courts of the
occupant without any necessity for extradition proceedings. Judgment IV.
4o7/x5 (Supreme Court of Germany in Criminal Cases, July 26, 1915) reported
in (1916) 21 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG i34, also reported in (1917) 44
CLUNET 260.
STATUTE OF FRAUDs--PART PERFORMANCE-PAYMENT OF RENT IN ADVANCE.-
The defendant made a verbal agreement to grant a lease of a farm to the
plaintiff. The latter, who had not taken possession of the farm, paid an in-
stallment of rent in advance. In an action for specific performance of the
agreement the defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds. Held, that the pay-
ment of rent without taking possession did not remove the case from the opera-
tion of the Statute. Chaprione v. Lambert (C. A.) [i917] 2 Ch. 356.
This is the first decision on the point in the English Court of Appeals and
follows and approves Thursly v. Eccles (i9oo) 49 W. R. 28r. It has, of course,
been long settled that the mere payment of the purchase price is not a sufficient
act of part performance to entitle the purchaser to specific performance of an
oral contract
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-DIscRIMINATION-EXCHANGE OF SERVICES WITn
RAI.RoAD.-In 1888 the defendant telegraph company contracted for an ex-
change of services with the plaintiff railroad company. The contract provided
for tvwo kinds of service by the telegraph company, "on-line" service, being
the carrying of messages for the railroad company along the common line
of the two companies, and "off-line" service, being the carrying of messages
to points beyond the line of the railroad. The 1g1 amendment to the Inter-
state Commerce Act brought telegraph companies within the operation of the
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Act and forbad discrimination, with a proviso that nothing in the Act should
prevent telegraph companies from entering into contracts with common carriers
for the exchange of services. Thereafter the telegraph company refused to
convey "off-line" messages at less than its rates to the general public. The
plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to perform its contract. Held, that
the contract was invalid as to "off-line service" at less than the rates to the
public. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. (1917, N. D.
Ill.) 245 Fed. 592.
The opinion contains a careful review of the legislation and authorities bear-
ing on the point A contrary ruling was made in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v.
Western U. T. Co. (i917, S. D., N. Y.) 241 Fed. I62,--a decision which is
said in the principal case to have been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second District.
TORTS-LABoR UNIONS-INUNCTION AGAINST ATTEMPTING TO UNIONIZE MINE
BY PEACEFUL MEANs.-The plaintiff, owner of a coal mine in West Virginia,
asked an injunction to restrain the officers and agents of the United Mine
Workers of America from taking steps to "unionize" the plaintiff's mine with-
out its consent. The employees of the plaintiff were working under contracts
permitting them to withdraw from the plaintiff's employ at any time, and on
the understanding that if they joined the United Mine Workers they were to
cease working for the plaintiff. The acts of the officers and agents of the
union consisted in: (I) peacefully urging the plaintiff's employees to join or
to agree to join the union; (2) getting those who agreed to join, but who had
not formally joined, to remain at work and to conceal the fact that they had
agreed to join; (3) certain acts described by the court as going beyond. "mere
persuasion" and amounting to "deception and abuse," "misrepresentation,
deceptive statements, and threats of pecuniary loss," but not including intimi-
dation or threats of physical injury. The jurisdiction of the federal court
depended entirely upon diversity of citizenship. Held, that the acts of the
defendants were illegal under the common law of West Virginia and should be
enjoined. Brandeis, Holmes and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitchell (1917) 38 Sup. Ct. 65.
The decision reverses that of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
reported in 214 Fed. 685, and with slight modifications restores that of the Dis-
trict Court, reported in 202 Fed. 51. A discussion of this case will appear
next month.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AT-INuRY AGGRAVATING PREVIOUSLY EXISTING
DISEASE.-The claimant broke his leg bone while engaged in a hazardous
occupation in the employ of the defendant He was previously afflicted with
congenital syphilis, and the accident so aggravated the disease that he became
totally blind. Held, that the claimant was not entitled to compensation for
permanent total disability due to loss of eyesight, but only to compensation for
the period during which the leg was disabled. Borgsted v. Shults Bread Co.
(9I17, App. Div.) 167 N. Y. Supp. 647.
Two judges dissented, in spite of the statement of Woodward, J., for the
majority that "the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Law was not to
abrogate the divine law that the 'sins of the fathers shall be visited upon the
sons, even to the third and fourth generation."'
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-INJuIs "ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF 'EMPLOYMENT"--EMPLOYEE INJURED WHILE ASLEEP-The claimant
was employed as a driver. After working on his wagon for several hours in cold
weather he came inside and sat down near the boiler to wait until an adjacent
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elevator was available for certain work he was required to do. While so wait-
ing he fell asleep and a spark or the heat from the boiler fire set fire to his
clothes and caused the burns for which compensation was sought. The respon-
dent contended that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of
employment. Held, that the claimant was entitled to compensation. Richards v.
Indianapolis Abattoir Co. (1917, Conn.) iO2 At. 6o4.
A night watchman employed by the defendant took a seat near an open door-
way on the second floor of the defendant's building, "dozed off" and, while
asleep, fell through the doorway and was killed. His widow filed a claim under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. An award in her favor was affirmed by the
Appellate Division. Held, that the deceased's injury did not arise out of and in
the course of his employment. Gifford v. T. G. Patterson, Inc. (1917, N. Y.)
117 N. E. 946.
The Connecticut opinion states that the accident happened while the employee
was on duty at a place where he might reasonably be, and that the fact that he
fell asleep was at most merely negligence, which under the Act did not defeat
his claim. The lower New York court took a similar view of the night watch-
man's conduct (165 N. Y. Supp. 1O43) but the Court of Appeals held that such
a conclusion could not be justified because the watchman's conduct was directly
contrary to the object of his employment.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr--"PmsoNAL INJURY BY AccIDENT"-DISEASE.-
The defendant furnished drinking water to the employees of his factory. The
water became infected and the claimant thereby contracted typhoid fever and
was temporarily disabled. The Minnesota Compensation Act provides for
compensation for personal injury by accident, defining "accident" to be "an
unexpected or unforseen event, happening suddenly or violently, . . . and
producing at the time, injury to the physical structure of the body." Held, that
the claimant's illness was not a personal injury by accident as defined in the
statute. State v. District Court (1917, Minn.) 164 N. W. 8Io.
This case is noteworthy chiefly as calling attention to a commendable attempt
in Minnesota to clear up by express statutory definition a question which has
been left in doubt under other workmen's compensation acts. For a discussion
of the general question with special reference to the Massachusetts act, see 27
YALE LAw JouRxAL, 144.
